FOI T1169/24 - Medicinal Cannabis
Following receipt of your request, searches were conducted with the People Sevices Department of Northumbria Police. We can confirm that the information you have requested is held in part by Northumbria Police.
We are able to disclose the located information to you as follows.
You asked:
1. What training programmes or courses have been provided to Northumbria Police officers regarding medical cannabis, and does this training cover the distinction between the CanCard and legally prescribed CBPM (Cannabis-based medicinal products)?
Students are made aware of medical cannabis, however the CanCard and CBPM are not discussed. Training/topics covered are as follows:
Lecture 1: Misuse Of Drugs Act
Controlled’ drugs law is complex – but there are three main statutes:
- Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/38/contents
- The Medicines Act 1968 - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/67
- The Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 - http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/2/contents/enacted (covered in the lecture on ‘Psychoactive Substances’.)
Medicines Act 1968
This governs medicines for human, and vet use, also includes manufacture/supply. Problems with off-label use of thalidomide.
Act defines 3 categories of medicine:
- POM: prescription only medicine (available only from pharmacist if prescribed by appropriate practitioner);
- P: pharmacy medicine (available only from a pharmacist but without a prescription);
- GSL: medicine which may be bought from any shop without a prescription. (General Sales List or ‘over the counter’ medicine).
No offence of simple possession: possession of a POM w/o a prescription is only an offence if the drug is also controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Therefore, e.g. possession of an antibiotic without a prescription is not an offence.
Lecture 2: Policing Cannabis
Medical cannabis can ONLY be prescribed by certain registered Doctors. Individuals CANNOT ‘take’ cannabis for ‘health/medical’ reasons WITHOUT this prescription.
2. How often is this training updated to keep officers informed about developments in medical cannabis laws and regulations?
The training provider will update any new legislation. Training staff on the module will have updates from the College of Policing, the module has recently been updated for optimization.
3. Are there guidelines in place for officers to differentiate between legal medical cannabis patients with legitimate medical needs and individuals using cannabis for recreational purposes?
4. What procedures are followed when encountering individuals who possess medical cannabis for legitimate medical reasons, and how is the validity of a prescription or CBPM confirmed?
Northumbria Police does not hold the information requested at points 3 and 4, as there is no specific guidance/procedure. However, this could form part of other operational training packages. Students are made aware that if medical cannabis is issued, they will have a personal certificate issued. Section 5A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 provides a defence if a specified controlled drug is prescribed or supplied in accordance with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and taken in accordance with medical advice.
Key Facts taught:
"Medical cannabis" is a broad term for any sort of cannabis-based medicine used to relieve symptoms.
- Products must satisfy three conditions to be defined as ‘cannabis-based product for medicinal use in humans:
- is or contains cannabis, cannabis resin, cannabinol, or a cannabinol derivative;
- is produced for medicinal use in humans; and
- is a medicinal product or a substance for preparation for use as an ingredient of, or in the production of medicinal product.
- CBPM (cannabis-based prescription medication) cannot be smoked – if they disclose that they have smoked it then they cannot rely on medical defence.
- Medicinal prescription available through both NHS and Privately.
- Prescriptions only provided by doctors that are on the GMC Specialist Register.
- History that patient have tried 2 other alternative medicines.
- Patients are advised to carry prescription in original packaging with original dispensing label.
- Patients are NOT required to carry any additional form of ID. Advised to carry electronic copy of their prescription (Specimen prescription attached).
- Prescription will be on an FP10PCD, and should contain the following:
- Dispensary Stamp
- Age including Date of Birth
- Title, Forename, Surname and Address of the patient
- NHS Patient Number
- Brand, Quantity (words and numbers) of Product, THC/CBD ratio and dosage
5. How would Northumbria Police officers handle a traffic stop of a medicinal patient who is not impaired but admits to being a medicinal patient? And what ANPR markers and for what reason would be put on their car?
It will be for the defendant and court to determine whether they agree on the medical defence. Northumbria Police would continue to record all evidence of impairment at the roadside as we normally would, i.e. redness of sclera of eyes, dilated pupils etc. and if they make a comment of smoking a joint.
In relation to ANPR markers, this information will not be supplied and by withholding this we rely on the following exemption:
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 31 is prejudice based qualified exemption and as such there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in providing the information as well as carrying out a public interest test. We have carried these out below.
Evidence of Harm
Modern day policing is intelligence led and law enforcement depends upon the development of intelligence and the gathering and security of evidence in order to disrupt criminal behaviour and bring offenders to justice. As criminals adapt and exploit new technology, the police need to respond by overcoming these barriers in order to meet their responsibilities.
As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, releasing any information held regarding ANPR markers would impact on law enforcement. Revealing this information for operationally sensitive areas of policing, would give perpetrators the opportunity to further explore police tactics that are used in this area of policing and thus determine the focus of police investigations. This would enable criminals to determine what tactics are currently being utilised and how, giving them invaluable information on current policing practices which they could then use to instigate countermeasures in order to avoid detection and avoid law enforcement.
This would undermine the process of preventing or detecting crime and the apprehension of prosecution of offenders.
Public Interest Test
Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31
Releasing information would provide an insight into the police resources available and enable the public to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the police. The release of such information would demonstrate the openness of the organisation and would contribute to the accuracy and quality of public debate
Factors against disclosure under Section 31
It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and so releasing information held at this point would allow the identification of police tactics used to apprehend offenders and will undermine and compromise law enforcement.
There are significant risks associated with providing information that can assist criminals by releasing information of what we may be trying to protect.
The Police Service would not wish to reveal any information, such as the location that seized/dangerous dogs are housed, that would undermine the law enforcement operations, would impact on police resources and negatively impact on public safety and undermine the policing purpose. This in turn would place the public at a greater risk.
A disclosure under Freedom of Information is a release to the world and, in this case, disclosing any information relating to sensitive areas of operational policing, would undermine the process of any investigative inquiry relating to specific offences where ANPR markers are used.
Balance Test
The security of the public is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk, due to providing information which would compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing resources and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately prepared and effectively use ANPR markers against offenders from harming the public, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police resources and operations.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. It is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for exempting your request at this part is relevant. It is not in the public interest for law enforcement tactics or resources open to us to be compromised with the disclosure of such detail, which would be a realistic scenario if such detail was put into the public domain.
Law Enforcement is reliant on community engagement, intelligence and evidence gathering and when it is appropriate, information is given to the public. What has been established in this case is the fact that disclosure of information relating to ANPR markers would have an adverse effect on the investigative process and on the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders. This places the victims of such offending at a greater risk, which is not an action the Police Service would be willing to take. These negatives outweigh any tangible community benefit and therefore the balance does not favour disclosure at this time.
You should consider this to be a refusal notice under section 17 of the Act for this part of your request.
In addition, Northumbria Police will neither confirm or deny any other information is held in relation to this part of your request and by doing so we rely on the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning certain Security Bodies
Section 24(2) - National Security
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to evidence harm or consider the public interest.
Sections 24 and 31 are prejudiced based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to evidence the prejudice (harm) in disclosure and consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying that information is held is appropriate. We have set these out below. In accordance with best practice, we have detailed the harm first.
Evidence of Harm:
Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information relating to the covert use of such ANPR technology would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of such technologies would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists and based upon current intelligence the threat level is set at Substantial. It is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means. Confirming or denying whether any information is or is not held relating to the covert use of ANPR technologies would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorist would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies.
In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to map where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed. This information can be used to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them. Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Public Interest Test
Section 24 - Factors favouring confirming or denying that any other information is held:
Confirming or denying that any other information exists relevant to the request would lead to a better-informed public and the public are entitled to know how public funds are spent. The information simply relates to national security and disclosure would not actually harm it.
Section 24 - Factors against confirmation or denying that any other information is held:
To confirm or deny whether Northumbria Police hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security.
By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure on the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
Section 31 – Factors favouring confirming or denying that any other information is held:
Confirming or denying whether any further information is held would allow the public to see where public funds have been spent and allow the Police service to appear more open and transparent.
Section 31 - Factors against confirmation or denying that any other information is held:
By confirming or denying whether any further information is held would mean that law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. Security arrangements and tactics are re-used and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. These security arrangements and tactics would need to be reviewed which would require more resources and would add to the cost to the public purse.
Balancing Test
The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security; this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test for confirming, nor denying that information is held is appropriate.
However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any other information that would meet this part of your request exists or does not exist.
You should consider this to be a refusal notice under Section 17 of the Act for this part of your request.