FOI/1110 - Palestine Action
Provision of information held by Northumbria Police made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the 'Act')
Thank you for your email received on the 21 July 2025 in which you made a request for access to certain information which may be held by Northumbria Police.
As you may be aware the purpose of the Act is to allow a general right of access to information held at the time of a request, by a Public Authority (including the Police), subject to certain limitations and exemptions.
We have now had the opportunity to fully consider your request and we provide a response for your attention.
Following receipt of your request, searches were conducted with Force Coordination and Operations Department of Northumbria Police. We can confirm that the information you have requested is held by Northumbria Police.
We are able to disclose the located information to you as follows.
You asked:
Please provide me with copies of all guidance that has been provided to police officers regarding the recent proscription of Palestine Action under terrorism legislation.
For the avoidance of doubt, this should include any written guidance about the policing of the proscription of Palestine Action specifically, as well as any guidance about the policing of proscribed groups in general - whether or not the guidance specifically mentions Palestine Action.
It should also include the minutes of any meetings, or documents relating to any presentations, which have been prepared for the purpose of providing guidance to officers.
Please provide me with any such guidance which has been issued since 01 July 2025.
Thank you for your email received on the 21 July 2025 in which you made a request for access to certain information which may be held by Northumbria Police.
As you may be aware the purpose of the Act is to allow a general right of access to information held at the time of a request, by a Public Authority (including the Police), subject to certain limitations and exemptions.
We have now had the opportunity to fully consider your request and we provide a response for your attention.
Following receipt of your request, searches were conducted with Force Coordination and Operations Department of Northumbria Police. We can confirm that the information you have requested is held by Northumbria Police.
We are able to disclose the located information to you as follows.
You asked:
Please provide me with copies of all guidance that has been provided to police officers regarding the recent proscription of Palestine Action under terrorism legislation.
For the avoidance of doubt, this should include any written guidance about the policing of the proscription of Palestine Action specifically, as well as any guidance about the policing of proscribed groups in general - whether or not the guidance specifically mentions Palestine Action.
It should also include the minutes of any meetings, or documents relating to any presentations, which have been prepared for the purpose of providing guidance to officers.
Please provide me with any such guidance which has been issued since 01 July 2025.
Please see the attached PDF document which contains the information suitable for disclosure. It should be noted that some information has been redacted and several other documents have not been disclosed, as we have considered the following exemptions are applicable to withhold.
Section 23(1) - Information Supplied by, or concerning certain security bodies
Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 23(1) - Information Supplied by, or concerning certain security bodies
Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2) - Personal Information
Section 23 is an absolute exemptions which means that the legislators have identified that harm would be caused by release and there is no requirement to consider the public interest test.
Section 40(2) is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in disclosure. That being said where Section 40(2) is engaged in order to make the exemption absolute there needs to be evidence that a data protection principle would be breached by disclosure. In this case it would not be fair to process information which, we believe by providing all the information you have requested, could lead to the identification of an individual. Therefore the first principle of the Data Protection Act would be breached in respect of those named in the report.
Section 24 is a class based qualified exemption and Section 31 is prejudice based qualified exemption and as such there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in providing the information as well as carrying out a public interest test. We have carried these out below.
Evidence of Harm
As you may be aware, disclosure under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, releasing all of the information sought, would reveal specific strategies, rationale, intelligence and tactics in relation to the identification and policing of proscribed terrorist groups. This could be used by criminals, those with criminal intent, members of proscribed organisations, and terrorists to undermine and obstruct operational policing, as well as amend their current practices to evade detection. This would consequently be detrimental to the police’s ability to ensure the law is enforced, offenders apprehended, public safety is maintained and threats to the security of the United Kingdom (UK) are identified and prevented. This would lead to an increase in harm of attacks and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’, see link: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists.
Furthermore, disclosure of the information to the level requested from multiple forces would result in patterns of police activity, tactical capabilities and operational planning in respect of terrorist proscription and operational planning in relation to the policing of proscribed groups, being identified. Identification via this mapping effect of what may appear less resourced or actively policed areas risks those areas becoming targets for individuals with criminal intent, to exploit. This undermines policing, increasing the risk of crime and threatens public safety. Given the information in question is directly relevant to counter terrorism strategy and policing of proscribed terrorist groups, this in turn impacts upon the overall security of the UK.
Additionally, disclosure of all of the information captured by this request would undermine the effectiveness of current and future police operations and proceedings. It would reveal details of police intelligence and strategy used to counter criminal activity and apprehend offenders. This places the community at increased unnecessary risk of harm and impacts on police resources if additional resources and tactics need to be put in place to counter any harm caused by an adverse FOIA disclosure. Information that undermines the operational integrity of the police will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on operational law enforcement.
Public Interest Test:
Factors favouring disclosure under Section 24
The pubic are entitled to know public money is spent in areas of operational policing. Release of the information would facilitate transparency. It would also encourage public debate about how the police prevent and detect crime and uphold the law in terms of proscription of terrorist groups in order to protect the security interests of the UK.
Factors against disclosure under Section 24
To disclose all of the information would render security measures less effective by revealing details of individual force capabilities which could be put together to formulate a national picture of operational counter terrorism strategy. Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information that may aid a criminal, terrorist or proscribed organisation should be disclosed. To what extend this information may aid terrorism in the UK is not precisely known, but it is clear that a disclosure of information will have an impact on the force’s ability to monitor and police proscribed terrorist groups and terrorists effectively; compromising the security of the UK.
Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31
Disclosure of information would provide the pubic with better understanding of operational policing, increase public debate and provide information which may allow the public to take steps to better protect themselves. This awareness may also lead to more information being passed to police by the public as they become more alert to suspicious activity.
Factors against disclosure under Section 31
By disclosing all of the information, law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime specific to terrorism. More crime would be committed because members of proscribed terrorist organisations as well as terrorists more widely, would have knowledge of operational capability, tactics, strategy and intelligence which would allow then to operate more effectively as well as avoid detection. This places the public at a significant risk of harm, particularly in areas which may have been perceived to be more vulnerable that others as s result of the mapping effect explained within the harm. Any information which undermines operational law enforcement or places the public at risk is not in the public interest to disclose.
Balance Test
The security of the public and the country is paramount, and the police service will not divulge any information if to do so would place the safety of an individual, the public at large or the national security of the UK at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in transparency of policing activities and promotion of public debate to improve public response, there is a far stronger public interest in safeguarding national security, the integrity of operational policing and keeping the public safe. For these reasons we believe that the balancing test for disclosing the information is not made out in this case.
Such a disclosure that would allow those with criminal intent the ability to build up a mosaic picture of force capabilities and strategies in dealing with proscribed organisation, which could be used to undermine law enforcement, which places the community at increased unnecessary risk of harm and impacts on police resources would not be in the public interest. These negatives outweigh any tangible community benefit and therefore the balance does not favour disclosure of all of the information at this time.
You should consider this to be a refusal notice under section 17 of the Act for these parts of your request.
Section 40(2) - Personal Information
Section 23 is an absolute exemptions which means that the legislators have identified that harm would be caused by release and there is no requirement to consider the public interest test.
Section 40(2) is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in disclosure. That being said where Section 40(2) is engaged in order to make the exemption absolute there needs to be evidence that a data protection principle would be breached by disclosure. In this case it would not be fair to process information which, we believe by providing all the information you have requested, could lead to the identification of an individual. Therefore the first principle of the Data Protection Act would be breached in respect of those named in the report.
Section 24 is a class based qualified exemption and Section 31 is prejudice based qualified exemption and as such there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in providing the information as well as carrying out a public interest test. We have carried these out below.
Evidence of Harm
As you may be aware, disclosure under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, releasing all of the information sought, would reveal specific strategies, rationale, intelligence and tactics in relation to the identification and policing of proscribed terrorist groups. This could be used by criminals, those with criminal intent, members of proscribed organisations, and terrorists to undermine and obstruct operational policing, as well as amend their current practices to evade detection. This would consequently be detrimental to the police’s ability to ensure the law is enforced, offenders apprehended, public safety is maintained and threats to the security of the United Kingdom (UK) are identified and prevented. This would lead to an increase in harm of attacks and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’, see link: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists.
Furthermore, disclosure of the information to the level requested from multiple forces would result in patterns of police activity, tactical capabilities and operational planning in respect of terrorist proscription and operational planning in relation to the policing of proscribed groups, being identified. Identification via this mapping effect of what may appear less resourced or actively policed areas risks those areas becoming targets for individuals with criminal intent, to exploit. This undermines policing, increasing the risk of crime and threatens public safety. Given the information in question is directly relevant to counter terrorism strategy and policing of proscribed terrorist groups, this in turn impacts upon the overall security of the UK.
Additionally, disclosure of all of the information captured by this request would undermine the effectiveness of current and future police operations and proceedings. It would reveal details of police intelligence and strategy used to counter criminal activity and apprehend offenders. This places the community at increased unnecessary risk of harm and impacts on police resources if additional resources and tactics need to be put in place to counter any harm caused by an adverse FOIA disclosure. Information that undermines the operational integrity of the police will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on operational law enforcement.
Public Interest Test:
Factors favouring disclosure under Section 24
The pubic are entitled to know public money is spent in areas of operational policing. Release of the information would facilitate transparency. It would also encourage public debate about how the police prevent and detect crime and uphold the law in terms of proscription of terrorist groups in order to protect the security interests of the UK.
Factors against disclosure under Section 24
To disclose all of the information would render security measures less effective by revealing details of individual force capabilities which could be put together to formulate a national picture of operational counter terrorism strategy. Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information that may aid a criminal, terrorist or proscribed organisation should be disclosed. To what extend this information may aid terrorism in the UK is not precisely known, but it is clear that a disclosure of information will have an impact on the force’s ability to monitor and police proscribed terrorist groups and terrorists effectively; compromising the security of the UK.
Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31
Disclosure of information would provide the pubic with better understanding of operational policing, increase public debate and provide information which may allow the public to take steps to better protect themselves. This awareness may also lead to more information being passed to police by the public as they become more alert to suspicious activity.
Factors against disclosure under Section 31
By disclosing all of the information, law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime specific to terrorism. More crime would be committed because members of proscribed terrorist organisations as well as terrorists more widely, would have knowledge of operational capability, tactics, strategy and intelligence which would allow then to operate more effectively as well as avoid detection. This places the public at a significant risk of harm, particularly in areas which may have been perceived to be more vulnerable that others as s result of the mapping effect explained within the harm. Any information which undermines operational law enforcement or places the public at risk is not in the public interest to disclose.
Balance Test
The security of the public and the country is paramount, and the police service will not divulge any information if to do so would place the safety of an individual, the public at large or the national security of the UK at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in transparency of policing activities and promotion of public debate to improve public response, there is a far stronger public interest in safeguarding national security, the integrity of operational policing and keeping the public safe. For these reasons we believe that the balancing test for disclosing the information is not made out in this case.
Such a disclosure that would allow those with criminal intent the ability to build up a mosaic picture of force capabilities and strategies in dealing with proscribed organisation, which could be used to undermine law enforcement, which places the community at increased unnecessary risk of harm and impacts on police resources would not be in the public interest. These negatives outweigh any tangible community benefit and therefore the balance does not favour disclosure of all of the information at this time.
You should consider this to be a refusal notice under section 17 of the Act for these parts of your request.